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INTRODUCTION
Since 2004, the implementation of democracy values in
Indonesia political systemhas brought up many transforma-
tions for many reasons. First of all, democracy put power
into the hands of the people. In order to obtaining office
chair, the candidate either party politic should be approach-
ing common people to make sure their ballot submitted in
vote acquisition of candidate. Secondly, media has been
developed modern and sophisticated that able to reaching
wider people so that political advertisement in media can
be assumed as effective and efficient tools to influencing
political preferential of people. Thirdly, in democracy
system, there is not allowed to make intimidation or
coercive action to people to enforce their ballot to submit
in election. Candidate or party politic should be establish-
ing mutual relationship within people in order to gaining
their sympathy which converted vote. Therefore, general
election was held in 2004 indicated political transformation
from party centered-campaign to candidate centered
campaign and labor centered campaign to capital centered
campaign. It was concluded that general election in 2004 is
decent interpreted capitalization of democracy wherein
affinity and affiliation to candidate or political party even
politics of image is pivotal key to maximizing vote from
people.
In light of the both problems, in order to exploit all
possible electoral vote sources, the candidate or party may
issue populist policy to appeal to voters to elect their self in
Wasisto Raharjo Jati
Researcher at the Center for Media and Political
Institute in Yogyakarta;
Email:  wasisto.raharjo.jati@gmail.com
Fake Populism or Real Populism:
Pork Barrel Policy as Political




This article aims to analyze the practice of pork bar-
rel politics in the level of Indonesia legislature tiers
and its political management campaign. Since 2004,
electoral democracy already delegate to the com-
mon people to chosen their representation directly
through general election in the level executive and
legislative. Those conditions oblige politician and
political parties to approaching the commons in
order to obtain their vote and popularize both ac-
tors into public. The paradigm of research is a pork
barrel politics. This paradigm supports to understand
and analyze the corruption symptoms i.e. politico
corruption in legislative tier and electoral-corrup-
tion in political-campaign which become chronic
problems in this country.  Result of research has
showed populism is pivotal key which triggered up
politician and parties to corruption in order to per-
sist their political tenure and funding their political
cost in pursue to re-elect again in second office
terms.No matter their corruption practice that impli-
cate to budgeting fraud. Both actors take political
favor to disguise within social aids following the
governmental policy, so that, they hindered from
corruption accusation.Finally, this paper wants to
recommend legal improvement into our budgeting
cycle wherein there are public participation to watch
it and moral improvement to politician and parties
to reducing their corruption if they wants to become
truly populist politician figure into public.
KEYWORDS: pork barrel politics, political corrup-
tion, electoral corruption, populism, election.
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general election. It is such as political engagement
among politician and people to building credibility
and reliability that ensure votes only distributed in
specific candidate and political party. Populist policy
can be classified as social aid which its characteristic
sporadic and temporary to help people trouble.
However, populist policy also can be realized pre-
commit from parties and politician to their con-
stituent to carry out certain policy actions if they
take power and hold tenure as public officer. In
this context, debate on budgeting as policy funding
sources become crucial to discussed amidst rivalry
of politic, people, and technocratic interest.
The meaning populist policy is susceptibleto
becoming hidden campaign project for candidate
and parties. Because responsibility towards the use
of budget reluctant to be announced to public.
Both actors are always toobscuring objective and
benefit of use of budgeton behalf of people. The
term “people” politicized to pushing through
invisible budget which is actually to be corrupted in
buying people vote in general election campaign.
This practice is manifestation of political corrup-
tion practice which took place in a legalformal
relation.  The discussion about populist policy
issued by regime is a form of dilemmatic values
between process of politicization and technocratic.
Politicization of budgeting was indicated politician
and parties are attempting in pursue to re-elected
again.
They want to take benefit from issue of populist
policy to enhancing popularity in their constituent
instantly and rapidly. As result, political benefit
who gained by politician and parties were not
involving technocratic process that formed
through the state budget allocation. The logic of
technocratic reason in built policy consensus is
necessary one; because, implication of public policy
needs to be analyzed and scrutinized to determine
the impact to the people. Therefore, populist
policy issued sporadically without deep analysis
about this impact can be argued lack of responsibil-
ity and accountability to beaccounted in legislative.
Implementation of populist policy also not obvi-
ously its purpose and policy objective due to orien-
tation of this policy is blurred. People seem do not
find out about its policy whether this policy is
officially from government vice versa. That is what
makes populist policy abundantly rising up much
critical from people due to misconceptions about
its substance about this policy. It can be said that
populist policy is blunder policy which this purpose
and objective tend to be campaign toolsfor candi-
date or parties to boost their popularity in their
constituent.
In particular within populist policy, they may
become saint who helps people from difficulties of
life with abundant funds; yet, they can promote
their figures that inducecommon people to elect
their in election. The politicians who hold tenure
as incumbent and political party still become ruling
party is very advantageous about this situation.
They can disguise as formal officer to issuing and
executing populist policy on behalf government
programs. In dissemble true objective towards
these policy what it was that won re-election,
incumbent has many ways to hindered from
accusation of black campaign which alleged from
their political rivals. One way to avoiding these
negative accusations toward populist policy by
quoting legal basis that underlined towards policy
issued. As expected, incumbent is freed from its
accusations that bind him. The context of populist
policy eventually only to be political cosmetic for
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politician and parties to strengthened their image
in common people as politician who took con-
cerned about the people after all.
Politicians and parties tend to strive to cultivate
personal reputations for delivering targeted indi-
vidual or local benefits to constituents, which has
fostered the development of personality figure who
friendly by means spreading social aid (Shin, 2011).
They emphasized social aid to remake his image
artificially especially toward general elections.
Therefore, social funds which obtained from
national and local budgeting is urge and significant
for candidacy in pursue political opportunity to be
re-elect again in second term in public
office.Candidate-centered campaigns, which usually
make social aids from government as personality or
campaign agenda always could potentially under-
mining budgeting allocation; because, these fund-
ing allocation of this programs can be seizing other
allocation which should be prioritized.
The distortion of budgeting which used politi-
cian and parties were indicated by spending re-
sidual budget from past allocation to funding their
programs. Residual funds should be deposited in
renewal budget to replenish other allocation which
presumably still less enough from its funding. The
other parameter can be traced from budgetary
markup practice which always used to politician
from national budgeting to use his own as political
campaign capital. The types of political spending
from markup practice that are targeted will vary
depending on whether the spending is elite-ori-
ented or voter-oriented.It can be said as hush
money as political gratification in formal arena.
Politician needs to mobilize political support from
their colleagues to secure his position as incumbent
who hold public tenure, meanwhile; people as
voter also should be empowered by spreading social
funds to rebuild road, place of worship, public
school, local clinic, and many other public place
which is considered center of crowd people.  The
point of from causality between money, publicity,
power, and populism are money as dependable to
enhancing popularity which extracted within public
power.
As one can see, money and power be like two
same coins cannot be separated each other. Both
entities have relations to support political career. In
this context, populist policy issued towards general
election that it’s funding from budgeting sporadi-
cally and instantly can be called as pork barrel
politics. This politics aims to creating populist
figure rapidly based on spreading social funds
abundantly to the people. In addition to create
populism, pork politics used to draw sympathy
from people so that their ballot can be increasing
rapidly within a short time. However, pork barrel
in positive perspective can be analyzed as critical
way to banishing bureaucratic standoff in order to
accelerating redistribution social aids to common
people after all.
Thus, pork barrel politics in technocratic views
able to categorized as de-bottlenecking bureaucracy
procedure. Some people argued pork barrel may
necessary one to reducing social gap even poverty
that during all this time can’t be reached due to
limitation of funding and apparatus. Therefore,
politicians who are conducting pork politics to
increasing their charisma as populist figureto the
people as holder of supremacy power in democracy
system always make substantial effort in at least two
dimensions to stay in the office: establishing policy
platform and expertise and providing constituency
servicesto their districts such as pork barrel
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projects. Addressing to pork barrel politics as
populism machine, neither politician nor parties
have been concealed any potential suspicious from
other colleagues who hold clean political spirit.
They always have many political tricks to hold up
pork barrel politics as the only solution to execut-
ing social aids more as effective as efficient.
In this paper, I would like to analyze pork barrel
politics as primary political corruption at legislative
body especially in political campaign management
which wield pork barrel as their strategy to wield-
ing ballot in ahead of general elections. Discussing
about pork barrel that carried out dual function as
political machine to enhancing popularity based on
vote buying and political strategy to pursue political
opportunity to re-elect again were urge and signifi-
cant to be answered for many reasons. Firstly, pork
barrel is manifestation of electoral corruption
wherein politician insisted to preserve their patron-
age and client relation to commons throughout
vote buying based on pork barrel policy. Second,
pork barrel can be understood as budgeting corrup-
tion in our financial system. In this context, we
must admit that all budgeting is about politics;
most politics is about budgeting; and budgeting
must therefore be understood as part of political
game. Politician in the legislature chair will always
to wielding their political influence to affect their
political constituent through budgeting instru-
ment.
As result from both premises noted above, have
culminated become two legged-political corruption
that can able proceed legally in two arena; legisla-
ture and political campaign arena. Its practice
which can make this political corruption method is
difficult to reveal due to absence of legal instru-
ment to investigate these corruption. In realm of
Indonesian legislative body and its political cam-
paign management, pork barrel policy can be
common political practice that conducted by
politician to attract voter to submitting their ballot
into their polling in both local and national elec-
tion.  It can be indicated from much news report
about black campaign which always carried by local
regional chief, legislature member, even president
by spreading social aids to common people as
political recipient in many regions. These pattern
actually signed by approval from ruling party which
subsequently creates unequal competes amidst
other parties and politician who is yet become
public officer in governmental chair. Incumbent
either ruling party everlasting benefited towards
this unequal competition that made unhealthy
political competition.  Therefore, populism in this
context is urge and significant be discussed in order
to understanding correlation populism and pork
barrel policy.
Populism literally can be realized as political
attempt to make someone become popular figure
with accentuating kind personality who has good
moral and strong commitment to prospering
common peoples. Thus, populism have similarity
to creating politics of image which during this time
turn out compulsory provisions for politician either
who want to pursuing their opportunity become
regional local chief or legislature member and who
want insist their chair as public officer and running
the power in second terms in office. Populism can
able to differ from its intent and purpose that
branched become two classifications namely fake
populism or real populism. In the sense of real
populism, both politician and parties have strong
commitment to engage in politics as manifestation
of truly dedication for the people, so; pork barrels
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politics is unnecessary due to their political wage as
political aspiration to fulfilling basic needs of
people. Meanwhile, fake populism is political effort
to persuade commons as voter within spreading
political money abundantly from local or national
budgeting. Populism only turns out political mask
to covering up their ignorance about plight of the
people. Fake populism is political image for oppor-
tunist politician and parties to approaching com-
mons temporary in order to pursuing public office.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows.
Section 2 presents previously study of pork barrel
policy in many nations as comparative perspective
in analyzing Indonesian case and also elaborating a
political pork barrel theory of legislative or govern-
mental bargaining with budgetary and trade-off
practice wherein mechanism of vote-buying have
happened towards general elections. Sections 3
describe and elaborate implementation of pork
barrel policy as ordinary political practice in Indo-
nesia political realms, while Section 6 concludes
thepaper.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS
1) PORK BARREL AS POLITICAL CORRUPTION
The term of pork barrel politics was came from
history of budgeting in American politics since
1870. Its termderive from a practice of antebellum
slaveholders; they would give a barrel of salt pork
to their slaves most notably Negros, who scrambled
and fought with each other for a share. According
to the Oxford English Dictionary, the term acquired
its political meaning in the early 1870s. In 1870,
Edward Everett Hale used the term “pork barrel”
as a homely metaphor for any form of public
spending to the citizenry after American Civil War
ended. The U.S Congress and Senate hence use its
term to obtaining funds for popular projects in
their home districts. Pork barrel actually men-
tioned earmark as form of official policy that issued
from government and congress. Both had autho-
rized pork in the form of $1,500 to complete a
lighthouse in Maine, which was then part of
Massachusetts. The expenditure had the active
support of President George Washington and of
Rep. George Thatcher of Massachusetts. On
constitutional grounds, however, the same Con-
gress rejected a bill to aid a glass manufacturer.
Perhaps the second bill lacked presidential support.
Naturally, political earmark is more official term
instead “pork-barrel” in budgeting session in
legislature are. In the end, pork barrel often used
to address political distortion that practiced politi-
cian and parties by manipulating budget as their
populism.
Pork politic which was implemented by politi-
cian in this country less different if compared
within U.S wherein social aids to common people
categorized as political earmarks.  A political
earmark has been routinely political agenda for
legislator or senate member which devoted to
special specific project. US politician who has been
legislature member have a moral task to prosper-
ing their home district exemplarily direct funds to
their constituent as manifestation of aspiration
aids. There are two political views to understanding
political earmarks. First, political earmarks in
positive political reason is compassionate practices
whom want to be practiced from politician which
during this time less so concerned about their
home voter, so; earmark can be understood as
ethic politics to recompense their ballot in general
election. Secondly, earmark is mechanism of vote
buying which carried out politician and parties as
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by design and by product. In the terms of by design
approach, political earmark as well as pork barrel is
designed to hijacking other budgeting allocation to
be own campaign budgeting. The understanding of
political earmarks as by product can be analyzed as
political aspiration grant from politician to their
home district. However, there have always been
several fundamental problems in the discussions
surrounding pork-barrel. 1) The concept of “pork-
barrel” has never been made clear, and thus the
definition of the term is too narrowly interpreted.
Pork barrel is a dilemmatic concept has trapped in
political pitfalls between politicization of budgeting
and corruption actions. 2) Pork barrel has not been
sufficiently elaborated in campaign in political
science. Pork barrel only assumed as phenomenol-
ogy in political science to referring under-the-table
political deals between the legislators and the
President and an outcome of mutual interactions
between the local politicians and the President. 3)
Pork barrel seem to have failed to give a sufficient
answereconomic inefficiency of resource allocation
involved in pork-barrel politics have attracted very
little attention. 4) Most political scientist rarely to
analyzing political-corruption practice using this
perspective due to pork barrel practice is very
difficult to be evidenced. Its characteristic which is
happens in gray area which not necessarily accessed
by extra-parliamentary actors such as academia,
activist, and others. The pork barrel actor will be
afraid if other actor who have no interest within
this practice also penetrating this secret area
(Noda, 2011).  This paper will elaborate pork barrel
politics in both terms such as pork barrel as phe-
nomenology of politico corruption practiceand
pork barrel as vote seeking mechanism.
2) PORK BARREL AS POLITICAL BUDGET
CYCLE IN LEGISLATURE AREA
Pork barrel basically is chain series of
politicization of budgeting in legislature realms.
These practices have correlation within election
cycle and fiscal policy which had implemented in
20 years.  The assumption of macro-economic such
as oil and gas lifting, fuel price, inflation rate, and
economic growth always used politician to create
his pork barrel programs. Because, politician wants
to create good impression to their voter that pork
barrel have issued due to stable performance of
national economic. So, their voter can accepted
pork barrel as generosity action from government
(Farhan, 2013: 29). Thus, their practices subse-
quently developed become politics of image
wherein politician was to be conceived as commons
savior.  However, pork barrel should be realized as
budgeting corruption that implicates budgeting
fraud. Political budget essentially a political game in
budgeting session which politician who is become
legislature member was benefited to affect specific
budget allocation to be converted own political
funds. Research study about pork barrel as political
budget cycle was introduced Rogoff (1990), then
had been developed Shi and Sevensson (2002),
Brender and Drazen (2004), Streb, Lemaand
Torrens (2005), and Alt and Lasssen (2005). Ac-
cording to Rogoff, political budget cycle was indi-
cated within the posture of budget changes drasti-
cally, which cut taxes; increase spending and
transfers are not as usual. These budget distortions
can be happened due to politician wants to show
himself as good politician who always working hard
common’s wealth. Politician was used political trick
to boosting governmental spending during previ-
ous years to crafting high rate economic growth.
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Thus, politician can make his pork barrel policy to
attract public sympathy by issuing popular policy
such as job creation and declining fuel prices.
Public unaware that politician pork barrel can be
created high inflation due to popular policy has
been raising public demand over than commodities
supply.  Therefore, asymmetric information have
made a paradoxical effect wherein politician gain
political support about his pork barrel, meanwhile;
this practice make harmful effect to the budgeting
allocation which then corrupted for political sake.
Other reasons about asymmetric information as
base of pork barrel was came from Shi and
Svensson. Both argued that asymmetric case was
sourced from two things; moral hazard and rent-
seeking practice.  Moral hazard can be realized as
political effort from politician to manipulate
budgeting policy as political policy, meanwhile; rent
seeking is political way to own fundraising based on
manipulating budget allocations. These premises
subsequently added by Brender and Drazen which
argued the phenomenon of political budget cycle
usually occurred in newly democratic nations due
to lack of check and balances practice amidst
politician and parties. They have concluded that
populism in newly democratic nations built not via
commoditization of political ideology, but; through-
out spreading money politics and other social aids.
Therefore, the issuing of pork barrel policy based
on political budget cycle need strong political
commitment among other legislature member to
realizing this policy., discussing of cash outflow
from budgetary cycle is urge and significant to be
discussed in this context, which can be sought in
this diagram.
(see diagram)
In the table below can be explained political
budget cycle was initiated within submission of
policy programs proposals which contained many
pork barrel policies to the bicameral legislature
tiers. Thus, these proposals eventually to be dis-
cussed among legislature member either lower
house and upper house. During the process of
discussion about its proposals, politician from both
legislature member will be negotiated how much
the portions of pork barrel that will be gained for
Sources: Kohei Noda (2011:5)
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their constituent. Their negotiations processes
become significant to deciding budget allocation
which should be allocated, included how much
portion of rent that will be perceived from this
pork barrel. Its practice what makes  In the politi-
cal budget cycle, executive only become political
marker to signing pork barrel policy that issued by
legislature members.  The practice of political
constipations from legislature member to issuing
their pork barrel policy eventually impacted on
distortions of budget allocation. The governmental
spending was increasing so much rather than its
income.
In this context, pork barrel politics is unethical
budgeting practice which able categorized political-
corruption actions in budgeting for the following
reasons; 1) pork barrel project had waste million
money of people taxpayer which previously should
be used to fund many development projects. Both
politician and parties have executed tax for their
political agenda. They usually were targeting how
much potency of tax or residual funds from budget
in certain numbers. They already deceived many
taxpayers who believe their tax is used from other
people benefit, however; in reality, both actors
spend million taxes as hidden campaign project. 2)
The specific pork barrel projects are often trivial
and unnecessary for commons people most notably
school bag and education utilities for student,
frying pan for midwife, even cigarette for male.
It’s become ridiculous things wherein social aids do
not touch the root of society real problems. There-
fore, second reason had taught us that pork barrel
project only segmented to special recipients which
presumably considered as their loyal voter. 3) Pork
barrel spending provides unfair advantages to
incumbent politicians in elections (Walker, 2010). It
will make other competitors envy towards political
privileges which perceived by incumbent. Since
pork barrel spending often funds projects in a
legislator district, it often becomes a way for legisla-
tors to demonstrate their efficacy and value to
district voters.
Legislator who takes part in pork barrel spend-
ing may do so only to bring benefits to themselves
and their political careers, and not because they
believe the projects they are fighting for are actu-
ally worth taxpayers  money. In essence, legislators
are using budget to buy themselves votes. It’s no
wonder if amount of tax which perceived by state
always stolen all of suddenly towards election. Pork
barrel subsequently inherited in obligatory political
practice that parties and politician must do it.
There are some interesting premises that can
conclude in discussing pork barrel theory. 1) The
pattern of populism-seeking built throughout
synergy between rent-seeking practice and vote-
seeking practice. Rent-seeking can be conceived as
primary sources of politico-corruption practice
during this time. Thus, rent-seeking always hap-
pens in every tiers of governmental chair whether
in legislature, executive, and judicative.   Previous
study about practice of pork barrel politics as
primary politico-corruption sources had been
showed urgency of this policy to enhance populism
either politician and parties.  This urgency can be
stressed in two paths for redistributive pork barrel
as political sympathy funds. In one perspective,
pork barrel programs are “vote-buying” schemes
that mediate electoral competitionamong political
parties. The spending decision is centralized among
party decision makers,with no role for individual
legislators.
A key empirical prediction emerging from this
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perspective isthat spending will be allocated dispro-
portionately towards swing districts where voters do
not havea strong attachment to either the govern-
ment or opposition parties. “Vote-buying” scheme
has positioned party elites as king-maker to deter-
mine how much allocation of budget that able
converted hidden political campaign
foreachcandidate.It’s what make oligarchic rule in
political party wherein candidate who have inti-
mate relationship with higher officer can able
prosecutedhow much total budget as his pork
barrel politics. In addition oligarchic rule as deter-
miner pork barrel, their political cadre in
grassroots also prosecuted national or local budget
as their pork barrel on behalf acceleration of
people welfare by entrusting proposal of funding
assistance to their elite cadre who hold tenure as
public officer.  Indeed, higher officer will be grant-
ing national or local budget to their political
underlings as obligatory discretionary.  Many
“wild” assistance proposals and oligarchic party
addressed to legislature or executive officer already
made disruption into allocation of budgeting. The
most significant aspect from budget debauchery is
budget spending for social aids policy bigger than
other allocations. This condition usually happens
towards elections wherein many wild proposals
entrusted as political provisions. In spite of party
elite hold legitimacy, the patron chief is real
decision maker is more eligible to determine
allocation of pork barrel funds.
3) PORK BARREL AS MECHANISM OF “LEGAL
VOTE BUYING” IN GENERAL ELECTIONS
Characteristic of political voters in Indonesia
dominated in both type; patronage voter and client
voter. For those reasons, there are clash in institu-
tionalizing of political party to be classified in
clientelism and electoralism. The emergence of
democratic that had recently enacted long-estab-
lished traditions some sort: corruption, vote-
buying, patronage, and patrimonialism quite well
regarded as primary political strategy. Likewise,
construction of electoralism politics seems not has
better place when confronted with pragmatic
voters which interprets money as political barter to
gaining their vote in election (Zoelva, 2013:10).
Thus, particularly vote buying, these practices are
obligatory strategies that can bind their voters
involved issuing special policy to maintain political
loyalty. However, voters often claim that they
perceive money politics from many candidate but
they eventually cast their vote independently
parted from money politics that tied him from
specific politician.
The rise of vote buying as political strategies to
win on election can be analyses in some reasons.
First, politician wants to manage their constituent
in bargaining positions with patron adding their
resources to their voter. Second, its practice con-
tributed to the schema survival in the fittest in
political realm, politician has been insisted and
persisted to hold their political tenure as long as
possible. Third, vote buying has been political
habitus which has been taken for granted in
political practice. It may be well as code of conduct
amidst legislature member nowadays. Addressing
to those practice, politician quite not to straightfor-
ward to admit himself to carried out the vote
buying, although public aware that vote buying is
routines political life toward general election.
Therefore, aspect political funding to be critical
discussed in this context. Political adage which said
money is not sufficient, but it is necessary for
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successful campaign. Money is necessary
because campaigns do have impact on
election results and campaign cannot be
run without itmight be relevant to linking
vote buying and corruption. These both
entities have mutualism relations wherein
politician needs huge money to be self-
financing in general election and its donor
need wide accessibility to entering eco-
nomic policy arena through political
influence from politician. However, in this
context, pork barrel is necessary ones to be
compulsory task for fund raising to their
political funds. As noted above, pork barrel
is part of vote-buying strategies to maintain
patronage political machine which presum-
ably can be assumed as vote-getting vehicle.
For instance, pork barrel able to be imple-
mented in fake project even giving social
aids to commons in order to the politician
take political wish to binding their voter so
as they can re-elect again in general elec-
tion as legislature member.
(see Table)
According to the table, pork barrel
which issued in ahead of general elections
can be understood as political attempt to
create patron-client relations on constitu-
ent. Those schema has been depicted how
political influence brings out artificial
loyalty to their constituent involving pork
barrel. To begin, in newly democratic
nations like as Indonesia, implementing
open-list proportional system wherein
candidacy is most important figure to
approaching constituent. This condition
have enforced politician to remake him as
kind-hearted figure in order to attract sympathy
from voters. Therefore, pork barrel is part of
politician effort to show him as populist one by
utilizing pork barrel. In the end, public seems to
return the favor towards politician’s pork barrel, so
that; public directly submit their vote.
Previous study which using this “vote-buying”
perspective was came from Diana Evans (2004:159)
in her books entitles Greasing the Wheels: Using Pork
Barrel Projects to Build Majority Coalitions. Diana has
describes that pork barrel as vote-buying mecha-
nism occurs in legislature and political campaign.
In legislature area, pork barrel used for issued a
policy in house of representative and senate.
Politician either from Republican and Democrat
often realized pork barrel to minimize opposition
TABLE II: HOW PORK BARREL AFFECTING ELECTIONS
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poll in order to policy issuing can be accelerated.  It
can be called as political bargaining amidst politi-
cian in legislature to be united each other to
supporting governmental policy. They aware that
pork barrel is a vote hijacking for legislature
member which should be struggling commons
aspirations rather than their own political sake.
Pork barrel politics eventually become main instru-
ment in legislature to issuing public policy. Mean-
while, in political campaign, vote buying presum-
ably called money politics (Sulistyo, 2003). Politician
or parties who want to re-elect again in second
terms in office always prioritize money politic to
enhance their ballot through spreading money
envelope and funding assistance to their constitu-
ent. Another research within “vote buying” from
Allen Hicken (2002: 35)that explained vote buying
was a method of choice for many candidates as
they sought to cultivate personal support network.
The networks established within reliance from
voter to their candidate upon money politics. It will
be binding their loyalty and political support to
parties and candidate.
An alternative perspective emphasizes the role
of pork barrel programs in cementing
bargainsamong individual legislators and in build-
ing cohesion within governing legislative coalitions.
Along-standing literature has investigated the
political determinants of the allocation of
governmentspending in the United States. In the
standard view, parties play a relatively weak role in
legislativematters, distributive politics is decentral-
ized, and the seniority and committee assignments
of individuallegislators are decisive in the allocation
of spending, while party electoral
considerationsmatter correspondingly little. This
premise opposite within “vote-buying” scheme
which argued party elites have political authority to
determine pork barrel budget. Politician gained his
position as decision maker whom spending budget
allocation as own pork barrel funds.  In this con-
text, implementation of proportional system based
on open list had emphasized politician like political
skipper which conducting parties. Therefore,
politician is more popular than parties in pursue
popularity by involving pork barrel campaign while
political party experienced organizational degrada-
tion.
RESEARCH METHOD
The approach used in this study is a qualitative
approach. It is mentionthat due to a qualitative
approach to this study has characteristics such as
having an actualsetting, the researcher is the key
instrument, the data are usually descriptive and
narrative, the research aimedat acquiring the
meaning of data description to describe the causal-
ity and characteristics of thestudied units (Moleong,
2007 ). This research has used library research as
research method in analyzing data and writing
process. Library research is research method based
on literacy activities wherein researcher take
attempt to find answer from research question
from relevant works that supporting his research
(Zed, 2004). The writer gained information and
data by extensive reviewing of relevant published
materials (both printed and online) such as books,
articles, journals, reports and other resources.  All
of data subsequently analyzed to find correlation
from data then concluded in research answer in
this paper.  In this research, data collected from
any relevant studies which contained pork barrel
during 2009-2013, subsequently analyzed in causal-
ity between theory and empirical case.
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RESULT AND ANALYSIS
1) BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF LONG-STANDING
PORK BARREL POLICY IN INDONESIA PO-
LITICAL SYSTEM
This paper focused pork barrel policy during
2009-2013 which implemented House of Represen-
tative. In this case, I would like to analyze pork
barrel in this legislature tiers into two analyses
branch; pork barrel as vote buying schema to win
on general elections and pork barrel as political
fraud in our budgeting system. However, prior to
us been headed for the main discussion. It’s better
to us to find out about long-standing history about
this practice as comparative analyses to compare
within recent pork barrel policy.
Politico-corruption is heavily ingrained in our
local and national political system wherein this
practice could not be removed. Long time ago
before European colonization, merchants who
come to Indonesia to trade (especially inJava), have
to pay tribute to the ruler of the state he visited, as
a guarantee that hewould be protected by the ruler.
Meanwhile, politico-corruption in Dutch era
worsened in bureaucracies who were encouraged to
corrupt due to they suffer low salaries. In addition
to low salaries, politico corruption also happened
in elite officer which building patronage relation
throughout paying tribute fee to local royal mem-
ber to guarantee economic investment in their
area. It’s what makes rent-seeking and patronage
politics are two ancestry sources in discussing
political corruption in Indonesia.
Rent seeking can able to understood corruption
habituation attempt in pursue enhancing added
value for own wealth sake, whilst; patronage is
political effort to looking for protection towards
who have strong legitimacy in commons. In other
words, patronage is mechanism of trade-off rela-
tions wherein money bartered with protection to
ensure this dirty political corruption can’t be to
proven. The patron benefited from political
patronage within bribe portion from client. It will
be complicated if the two ancestry of politico
corruption in Indonesia can’t be eradicated in their
roots. Politico corruption has networked in tries
politico level which called nowadays as political
bribery.
There is no doubt that the escalation of political
corruption has increased since fallacy of New
Order in 1998. According data from Transparency
International (TI) in 2012, Indonesia corruption
perception index stranded on lowest rank amidst
other South East Asia nations within position 118th
from 176 nations had surveyed. Singapore is
becoming the best countries that have highest
corruption perception index in Asia to be ranked
in 5th.  Meanwhile, Malaysia was ranked in 54th,
Thailand and Philippines in 88th and 105th.  The
lowest corruption perception index which had
suffered Indonesia sourced from sluggish regula-
tion, rent bureaucracy, high cost of political fund-
ing activity, and manipulation on governmental
project.  In analysis of economic politic perspective,
politico corruption was come from six symptoms; 1)
the state plays a dominant role in which the public
sector, while: private sector can’t able to access. 2)
Pattern of economic development based on rent
capitalism that implicated unhealthy economic
rivalry. 3) Political intervention so much has great
influence on economic project wherein many high
officers in every economic institution is hold
tenure as political cadre. 4) Too many inefficient
and ineffective regulations abundantly in economic
regulations, 5) bureaucracy has many discretion in
Fake Populism or Real Populism: Pork Barrel Policy as Political Corruption in House of Representative During 2009- 2013 / WASISTO JATI / http://dx.doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2013.0015
269
Journal of Government and Politics Vol.4 No.2 August 2013
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
their task that create opportunity to finding other
material source within sell power legitimacy. 6)
Lack of transparency and accountability due to
limitation of watchdog spirit amidst bureaucracy to
watching their colleagues (Arifianto, 2001).
As noted below, roots of politico-corruption
built by synergy of rent seeking practice and pa-
tronage relation which have an impact on political
and economic activity. In the era of Soekarno
presidential era, politico corruption practice oc-
curred in process of nationalization or take over
the Dutch assets. In this case, military officer and
political elites already joint to seize and grab Dutch
asset as own treasury. Much business built on
nationalization, however; regime has supreme
control to decide economic actor who supposed
capable in developing economic investment. As
result, paying high tribute toward higher office
either civil service or military is obligatory and
necessary one. Thus, in Suharto era, politico-
corruption was exaggerating which centralized in
presidential families and his cronies. Both have
politico privileges to accepting money granting
from industries and corruption, regulate the
economic tender, and participate actively as mer-
chant. It’s not surprising that many businessmen
always negotiate with regime and become part of
economic client. Politico corruption practice in
Suharto era had initiated pork barrel era by issuing
policy namely presidential assistance, presidential
instruction, and presidential lotteries such as SDSB
and Porkas which held by Ministry of Social Affairs
to attract public sympathy and loyalty to regime.
This policy is concurrently with floating mass
policy which aimed to depoliticize public political
aspiration and keep up nation stability. Pork barrel
in the New Order era had been executed by legal
formal frameworks, so that; political corruption
aura can be diminished and disguised neatly. Pork
barrel policy during New Order era has been came
from state-owned enterprise, national budget.
According to Sidel, the practice of pork barrel
politics in New Order had been exercised effective
discretion over the disbursement of pork barrel
funds for public works and the appointment of
local police commanders, district engineers and
teachers of schools, provincial fiscals,
treasurers,and assessors, judges of the court of first
instance, and local agents ofthe Bureau of Lands.
Therefore, its policy have pervasive effect into
public who supposed as passive object which always
indoctrinated by legal pork barrel. It’s not surpris-
ing if regime has wide populism from their pork
barrel policy.  Meanwhile, pork barrel politic just
erases their political rival such as Indonesia Demo-
cratic Party or Party of Unity Development to gain
much ballot in the general election.
Thanks to “legal” pork barrel, Golongan Karya
(Functional Group) the regime political party
always wins in every general election from 1971
until 1997. Public as voter automatically recognize
so much party regime and Suharto figure as popu-
lar figure even so people savior. As evidenced,
either presidential assistance or presidential grant
can be effective mechanism of legal “vote buying”
from people to regime party. In this context can be
said that, pork barrel is manifestation of monetiza-
tion in people. Therefore, there is no formal
succession in New Order era, regime harmlessly
continuing rulership without any protest and sharp
critical from commons (King, 2003). Public already
obtained their pork barrel such as presidential
assistance such as social security aids, cheap basic
stuff, and many more which driven political incen-
Fake Populism or Real Populism: Pork Barrel Policy as Political Corruption in House of Representative During 2009- 2013 / WASISTO JATI / http://dx.doi.org/10.18196/jgp.2013.0015
270
Journal of Government and Politics Vol.4 No.2 August 2013
○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ ○
tive to supporting regime stability of power.  The
fallacy of New Order Era in 1998 has adopted
democracy as main instrument to driving the state.
It’s called Reformation era who hold strong com-
mitment to eradicate politico-corruption practice
which flourished during New Order era. However,
strong commitment been challenged with reorga-
nization of old elite to persist their rule in democ-
racy era.  It was indicated within informal legiti-
macy from politician and parties that pork barrel is
becoming political habituation which inherited in
political activity.  Pork barrel as habituation means
its practice of budget fraud that both actors carried
out in local or nation budgeting allocation. Democ-
racy has put commons people as least becomes
holder of supreme power which has authority to
chosen politician or parties will be public office in
this state. Consequently, approaching commons is
urge and significant to attract their support and
loyalty that able converted become ballot. Both
politician and parties should be more listening and
more compassionate to their people in order to
gaining their voter. Its have implication to the
rising of political cost that spent in commons.
Thus, schema of pork barrel politics during New
Order which emphasized in social assistance policy
as vote buying towards people was all much same
within contemporary era. Either politician or
parties take political attempt to popularize him and
strengthen their patronage relations to their
constituent.  In Indonesia democracy realms,
commoditization of political idea and political
ideology which prevailed in western democracy to
attract people is inapplicable. Because, the charac-
teristic of political voter in Indonesia is parochial
voter that usually tend to be pragmatic and passive.
They inclined to preserve status quo of political
and economic stability like as new Order done, so
that, political ideology as political bargaining to
constituent only become political junk.
Moreover, since 2004, peoples have been
become as supreme mandate holder. Indonesia
voter preferred to be approached within economic
material rather than political promises.  That
pragmatically democracy condition eventually has
driven our politician and parties become pragmatic
and opportunist political actors. Both actor take
political justify any means to be elected in general
election. Its political behavioral then conclude to
using the classic way as well as New Order to
preserve their reign by spreading populist policy
and money politics to binding their constituent
politically. Furthermore, high cost of direct elec-
toral democracy also supposed politician and
parties been spent much money during political
campaign in order to attract public votes.  There-
fore, during implementation of direct electoral era
since 2004 until present, practice of budgeting
fraud is compulsory task to our politician and
parties to funding and popularizes him into public.
It’s not surprising, aaccording to KOMPAS, the
rising of political cost during 2004 until 2013 have
estimated 44, 1 trillion rupiahs wherein its details
concluded according their political campaign.
Spending of political cost such as campaign, social-
ization, or spreading social aids is varied for each
other that depend on their political target.   In the
end, pork barrel re-known again in democracy
realm as effective political method to obtain public
vote.
2) PORK BARREL POLITICS AS POLITICAL
BUDGET CYCLE AND POLITICAL FRAUD  IN
BUDGETING SYSTEM 2009-2013
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Discussing about pork barrel in this section
focused in social aids project which usually issued
towards general election. Politicians who hold
tenure as public officer together with ruling party
usually considering those political project is neces-
sary ones to enhance their popularity in public.
They been aware that social aids will be feeding up
many funds from state budget wherein its funds
have allocated to others government subsidiary
programs to public basic needs. However, it seems
they apathetic with the swelling of the state budget
to funding their social aids. Thus, both political
actors only finds out that their social aids project
from extraordinary budget from state budget
which recently already known as SILPA. SILPA is
abbreviation from leftover budget spending in our
budgeting system denoted budgeting residue which
should be submitted in state allocation to
strengthen state budget next years.
In spite of to do, legislature feels to take political
favor toward this budget residue to own funds.
That political fraud can be looked in difference of
SILPA from legislature and State Audit Board in
2009-2013 which always oppose claims each other,
margin of difference number ranged 50-100 billion
rupiah. Legislature members hence still pretended
that difference is unproblematic due to state
budget will not be stolen, even public officer who
have full accessibility to access state budget.  Public
funding program for social grants program in
theBudget of 2009 reached 64,788,513,384,000
rupiahs wherein portion of social aids from politi-
cian is largest one (ICW, 2012)Suspected indication
about political fraud has been occurred in correla-
tion between national budgeting within election-
winning project. It was indicated from improve-
ment of budget allocation in the 2009 state budget,
particularly in social aids spending from central
government.  As we can see in this table, improve-
ment of social aids spending tends to increasing
rather than other budgeting allocation.
Manipulation of fiscal policy by legislature
members showed in political budget cycle. Its
practice indicated through mark-up certain alloca-
tion to be own social aids. Politicians have been
looking for the political momentum to seek politi-
cal fissure in budgeting system. Mark up can be
explained as budgeting effort to enhance money
portion to other allocation instantly and sporadi-
cally. Manipulation practice canbe discovered in
specific allocation which used as own pork barrel.
Asymmetries relations within judicative, that make
political bribery flourished in legislature tiers, so
that, they can easily to enhance fund portion to
funding own social aids. Its political bribery sourced
from own social aids based on mark-up policy. Its
political bribery presumably is result of political
consensus among legislature member to redistrib-
ute the social aids fund as their political funds.
Political demands of the party to donate their
bribery as operational funds has enforced politician
to exploit state budget. It’s not surprising when
portion of state spending always deficit due to
politico-corrupt habits from our politician in
legislature tiers.
In this context, there are relationship between
the state budget and budget for pork barrel which
can be argued in two primary reasons. Firstly, both
entities should be understood as political game
amidst legislative members and executive. Arrange-
ment of state budget which composed based on
macro-economic assumptions which been prevailed
in next year. However, legislature member hold
much better political bargaining power rather than
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executive during arrangement process. They can
stipulate own budgeting policy which adjusted
within governmental policy for specific purpose.
Therefore, relationship has built in that “politic of
adjustment” wherein pork barrel program been
disguised securely into governmental project. The
legislature demand can denied by executive due to
they can threaten to suspending budgetary discus-
sion sessionas political marker. Those condition
usually occurs towards general elections wherein
many legislature member attempted to succeed
their pork barrel programs been funded by state
budget schema. Legislature member will be di-
rected their own pork barrel to constituent in their
district.  Secondly, budget for pork barrel enable to
be enhanced concomitant with the increasing
prospect of macro-economic assumptions. Its
condition which encouraged many legislature
members to manipulate number of macro-eco-
nomic assumption in order to replenish their own
pork barrel programs as well as their political cost.
Consequently, asymmetric information would like
to be primary data to arrange budgeting allocation.
As noted above, the improvement of social aids
based on source from state budget has been flour-
ished in every year.  This condition triggered up
within political attempt from politician to manipu-
late fiscal policy in order to strengthen own politi-
cal funds. Swelling of state budget also contributes
significantly to the budget deficit. This deficit is
oddly enough due to the rising of political con-
sumption such as banner, short, political flag, or
sticker. Those conditions usually occurred in
political years, previous year before election. The
rising of political demand subsequently within state
budget, its deficit have implicated into budgeting
deficit. In 2009, improvement social aids in legisla-
ture tiers supposed as primary deficit sources in
state budget which contribute 1, 2 percent. That is
what makes, budgeting fraud wherein political
spending is higher rather than state income.
Nowadays, classic pattern seems to be repeated in
this year.
The increasing trend of social assistance also
showed a significant increase between the 2013
budget drafts before the House discussed the 2013
budget after the House of Representatives dis-
cussed. Social assistance increased from 69 trillion
rupiah in 2013 to 73.6 rupiah. Many trillion in
budget 2013 is manifestation of an increase of 14.5
TABLE III: PATTERN OF INCREASING FUNDS IN PORK BARREL PROGRAMS
Source: (ICW 2012: 132)
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trillion rupiah. It may be an increase in social
assistance is the result of legislative intervention
during the discussion of the budget to get a piece
rents that can be used as a tool campaigns.
3) PORK BARREL AS MECHANISM OF “VOTE
BUYING” IN POLITICAL CAMPAIGN
In early discussion already had explained that
vote buying is political attempt to preserve loyalty
through patronage relations. It was indicated
during political campaign in ahead of elections
wherein many money politics spreads to common
public in order to submit the vote and elect him
(Andreas, 2013: 120). This practice usually called as
political dawn syndrome due to money spreading
to the public when the sun has yet to show its light.
In this section, I would like emphasize pork barrel
analysis in aspiration funds from House of Repre-
sentative. The issuing of aspiration fund can be
explained not only vote buying but also candidacy
buying. The policy of aspiration funds which
initiated in 2009 and still going on actually oddly.
Because, legislature member already to have
political wealth abundantly from their wage and
allowance.  Those practices which raised suspicion
that aspiration funds is new modus to political
practice in legislature tiers.
The emergence of aspiration funds which
enacted since 2010. It had outrage much regulation
such as Act No. 17 of 2003 on State Finances, Act
No.1 of 2004 on State Treasury, Act No.32 of
2004 on Local Administration, and Act No. 15 of
2004 on State Management and Financial Ar-
rangements. The House did not given political
legitimacy to directing own budget policy to their
constituent because those legitimacy is governmen-
tal political side.In addition to unlawful, its legisla-
ture policy also becoming new source to wasting
state budget and might to be corrupted.  Aspira-
tion funds hence turn out controversial policy
wherein its policy have absorbs trillion rupiah from
state budget. In this case, legislature seems to
abusing his tenurewhich they should be abdicate
and dedicate him to common interest. However,
politician seems to fulfilling own political sake
either individual or party throughout its aspiration
funds.
Therefore, we must critical to interpret aspira-
tion words in this policy with questioning: aspira-
tion for whom? Who is benefited? Indeed within
aspiration funds, politicians who become legislature
member more benefited than politician extra-
parliamentary due to aspiration funds can be
political tools to strengthen and widening their
political basis.  Firstly, aspiration fund has been
remake budget posture be unequal an unbalance
due to its policy fed much fund from other budget
allocation. As we can see in this table, aspiration
funds intop three positions after special autonomy
funds. However, in order to disguise their pork
barrel policy in budgeting session. Legislature
members in House of Representative tend to
namely their aspiration policy as adjustment fund
to hindering any suspicious.
As noted above, we can see adjustment fund as
disguise form for pork barrel routinely increasing
in recently years. Although, allocation for adjust-
ment fund has been fluctuated, meanwhile; its
fund will be increasing rapidly towards general
elections. Therefore, from these budgeting ses-
sions, each legislature member hasobtained15
million rupiah that calculated within total of
legislature member reached 560 persons. So, there
are 8, 6 billion rupiah must be allocated for this
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policy. However, the meaning of aspiration funds
in this context is harmful. Because truly meaning
of aspiration funds is one of budget allocation
between executives and legislative which conclude
in amount of state budget which reached 1500
trillion rupiah. That is what makes this policy
becoming absurd, if we see working performance
from legislature members during all this time not
full-hearted to abdicate himself as public servant.
In spite of raised many critical, The House has
insisted and persistent to issuing their budget policy
to their constituent on behalf common interest
even though its fund only manifestation from
return of political investment to recharge their
political campaign and vote-buying.
Naturally, aspiration fund hold pivotal key for
politician to re-popularize him again in their
constituent.  In ahead of election, they usually
establishes house of aspirations as political place to
spreading their pork barrel policy such as basic
needs, money politics, or infrastructure funds.
House of Aspirations will be new modus of political
image for politician to re-elect again which always
ready anywhere and anytime to serve commons
interest. Vote buying usually happened in previous
days before Election Day by approach charismatic
figure in public as their campaign agent. Thus,
charismatic figure will be persuading their public to
re-elect specific politician whilst introduce its
politician and spreading pork barrel as political
gratification. As a result, through charismatic
figure and aspiration funds, patronage relation to
constituent has been established in political cam-
paign. Voter as client-voter will be directly to
TABLE IV: COMPARISON OF BUDGET POSTURE
Source: (Kumorotomo, 2012)
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submit their vote to the politicians.  With the 15
trillion in pocket and making cooperation relation
within charismatic figure, politician eventually can
save their political cost to fund him during political
campaign.
Therefore, aspiration funds in the context of
voting buying significantly have been correlated
within huge cost political spending for legislature
candidate who ranged from 250 million rupiahs
until 20 billion rupiahs, which depend on their
popularity in commons people. Artists who during
this time always broadcasted by media lastly spend
250 million- 1 billion, party cadre spent 600 mil-
lion-1, 8 billion, and businessman spent 1 billion
until 20 billion rupiahs. The large amount of
political cost that must be spent indicated moneti-
zation in struggle for attract voter from commons.
Monetization in this sentence can be explained as
political attempt to popularize himself based on
spreading money to commons in order to people
known him as well.  If the political campaign has
been corrupted by monetization, it’s not
surprisingwhen politico-corruption is very difficult
to be eradicated in political campaign. Populism
which built based on monetization usually not
sincerely to approaching commons as democracy
partner. It’s called namely fake populism wherein
populism only become political visor to performs
politician and parties which ones have truly sin-
cerely to commons people artificially. Thus, they
only suppose commons as political commodity
which their vote can be converted within money.
Therefore, this practice is not differing so much
within mechanism of vote buying during New
Order era, however; populism in those Order not
only established on monetization, but also repres-
sive and coercive practice from state apparatus who
strictly command to the people in order to loyal to
the regime.
Pork barrel politics in the post-Suharto era
actually had been succeeding with same mechanism
since New Order. Its policy usually issued toward
general election event when politician who become
incumbent still desires to re-elect again in second
terms in office. These political desires has sacrifice
national or local budget as their political victim
which resulted in budgetary fraud. This fraud thus
converted to funding artificial social aids which it’s
characteristic have contained political aura to
crafting populism instantly and effectively with its
objective to make public recognize the candidate.
Nowadays, pork barrel politic sourced from social
aids and social assistance was allegedly derived
practice of budgetary fraud. Incumbent politician
and ruling parties usually using this practice to
enhancing their popularity in the commons; so
that; they have political chance to re-elect again.
The propagation of its policy aimed to the poor
commons communities and villagers who are
presumably is easy to persuade their political
preferences. In addition to persuade, both social
aids and social assistance also used a way to re-
trench political cost. Prior to previous sentenced
already said that political cost has been consume
large amount of money.  Politician who holds
tenure as public office was benefited to politicize
national or local budget as their hidden pork
barrel politics. Although they never admitted to
politicize, public already known that the social
assistance and social aids which issued sporadically
is a manifestation of money politics towards gen-
eral election events.  In spite of pork barrel politics
actually used as mechanism of vote buying, how-
ever; the case of pork barrel politics in Indonesia
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just indicated there are of number of violations in
implementing social aids particularly the amount
of social aids which sudden reduced to funding
political campaign.  Its practice can be said that
pork barrel in Indonesia also functioned as practice
of fundraising for political cost.
According to data from FITRA can be con-
cluded that the amount of pork barrel politics in
local and national level reached trillions of dollars.
In national level, pork barrel politics is realized in
ministerial and presidential tiers, meanwhile; in
local arena, pork barrel is implemented in agency
tiers.  Executive who came from political party
cadre usually have vital role to scattering pork
barrel to popularize and make philanthropy image
to the people. Legislature tiers only becoming
political marker to boosting pork barrel practice
can be realized and executed.  In this case, I want
to said that pork barrel politics as politico-corrup-
tion practice has been inherited and networked in
our political system. Public already knew this dirty
practice, however, they also passive and silenced
about this practice. In democracy realms, public
have been transformed as pragmatic voter wherein
they only submitting their vote if their vote have
valued large amount of money. Its practice makes
pork barrel is difficult to be eradicated.
CONCLUSION
Based on this research, implementation of
electoral democracy through directly general
election has been generating paradoxically effect in
Indonesia political system.  Public which during
New Order only become passive political actors,
recently holding supreme mandate of political
sovereignty in this country since 2004.Those
condition enforced politician and parties to serve
aspirations from public in order to elected in
general elections. However, behind its democratic
realm, politico corruption and then electoral
corruption hence been flourished in democracy
realms. Both corruption practices associated in
political attempt to popularize him into public
through economic-material power. Public seems to
be approached within money rather than ideology.
Therefore, patronage culture still has been persis-
tent in our democratic era wherein political loyal-
ties have built through top-down mechanism via
pork barrel.
Pork barrel in this paper can be argued as
political strategy in political campaign and funding
strategy to replenish political cost. In this paper
already explained that causality between corruption
and election lied on the high pretension to gather-
ing political vote as well political cost to the fullest.
This condition which caused that issuing of pork
barrel policy is compulsory and obligated among
politician and parties.  Finally, pork barrel is not
aimed to helping commons, but; be campaign tools
which used to popularize both politician and
parties instantly and sporadically. Pork barrel can
be eradicated if our politic actors realize that this
practice is very detrimental. Hopefully, our politi-
cian can be engage in politics wholeheartedly.
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